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A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management

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A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management

Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo; García Jurado, Ignacio; Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
 
DATE : 2008-02
UNIVERSAL IDENTIFIER : http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1176
UNESCO SUBJECT : 1207.08 Inventarios
DOCUMENT TYPE : article

ABSTRACT :

In this note we deal with inventory games as defined in Meca et al. (Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:483-491, 2003). In that context we introduce the property of immunity to coalitional manipulation, and demonstrate that the SOC-rule (share the ordering cost) is the unique allocation rule for inventory games which satisfies this property.

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