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Juan C. Surís-Regueiro, Manuel M. Varela-Lafuente, M. Dolores Garza-Gil, Evolution and perspectives of the Fisheries Structural Policy in the European Union, *Ocean & Coastal Management*, Volume 54, Issue 8, August 2011, Pages 593-600

DOI: [10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2011.05.008](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2011.05.008)

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Evolution and perspectives of the Fisheries Structural Policy in the European Union

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Abstract

In 2011, the European Commission will make its legislative proposal for the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy public. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the direction the possible reforms to be implemented in the Fisheries Structural Policy will take. In order to do so, we will look at the recent results of the policy and its current situation, and study its trends. The main conclusion we can draw is that the future EU fisheries policy will not undergo major changes, neither in its fundamental principles nor with regard to its main goals or priority action axes. Eventual progress and any adjustments made to such reforms will take place within the ambit of the policy's specific action measures via the European Fisheries Fund.

1. Introduction

EU member states have transferred their legislative powers to common European institutions, with certain matters related to agriculture and fishing. The different European fishing rules and regulations form a legislative framework known as the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The European Commission (made up of Commissioners designated by the member states and EU officials) is the institution for ensuring that EU legislation is correctly applied in all the member states. The Commission also has the power to propose changes to common EU legislation.

In 2009, the European Commission announced their intention to begin the process of a legislative reform of the current CFP. A summary report was published to evaluate the possible results that could be obtained by applying the CFP and proposed ideas to improve the CFP (European Commission, 2009a). The Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy also sets out a time frame in order to address the legislative reform.

After publication of the Green Paper in April 2009, a public consultation process was initiated, the results of which were made known in 2010 (European Commission, 2010). The Commission will announce the CFP legislative reform proposal this year in 2011. In 2012, that proposal will be subject to approval via the co-decision procedure; that is, it must be approved by the European Parliament (whose elected members must safeguard EU citizens' interests) as well as by the European Council (whose members represent the governments of all the member states). If this procedure is negotiated successfully, the reformed CFP could come into effect in 2013.

According to the Green Paper, the Commission labels the results achieved by the CFP as a failure, due to the unsolved problem of generalised overfishing that characterises the majority of EU fisheries (See also Commission Working Document, 2008). It also understands that the main reason for overfishing is the excessive capacity of the European fishing fleet, which gives rise to fishing sector scenarios that are highly vulnerable when faced with a negative factor (such as the reduction of fishing quotas or an increase in production costs) and highly dependent on subsidies paid for with public funds. Studies, such as those by González-Laxe (2002), Penas (2007, 2008) and Khalilian et al. (2010) agree with this assessment.

Unintentionally, the subsidies associated with the CFP have to some extent, led to this situation of overcapacity in the European fishing fleet. Specifically, public aid for the construction of new fishing vessels and for fleet renewal or modernisation, channelled via the Fisheries Structural Policy, have brought about an increase in the effective fishing capacity of the EU (Surís-Regueiro and Garza-Gil, 2005; Markus, 2010; Villasante and Sumaila, 2010; and Villasante, 2010). Given this situation, it is quite probable that the Fisheries Structural Policy could undergo significant changes during the process to reform the CFP.

Our study aims to document this situation and evaluate the perspectives, which open up around the matter. In order to do so, firstly we will briefly look at the historical evolution of the CFP and the European Fisheries Structural Policy. We will then make a brief assessment of the results reached by such a policy after the last reform in 2002.

Following, we will analyse the current situation, before we evaluate the scope of adjustments or improvements, which could be undertaken with a new reform of the CFP.

2. The evolution of the Fisheries Structural Policy.

In order to understand the Fisheries Structural Policy's current form within the European Union and how it works with regard to the ongoing reform of the CFP, it is necessary to briefly go over its historical evolution (González-Laxe, 2008), which we summarily represent in **Figure 1**.

In an initial stage (1957-82), fishing formed a part of the Common Agricultural Policy and the majority of the action taken within the EU was aimed at achieving increased productivity and better standards of living for collective farmers and fishermen.

In 1983, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was created on the basis of four main pillars: the Market Policy (establishing the regulations for marketing fish and a system whereby minimum sale prices for fish products are sustained), the Fisheries Structural Policy (whose aim is to improve the competitiveness and sustainability of the fishing industry), the Resource Policy (which establishes the regulations to protect natural fishery resources) and the External Relations Policy (responsible for international fishing agreements).

With Regulation 2908/83 of the European Council, modified by Regulation 4026/86 and Regulation 3944/90, the first structural policy for the overall EU fisheries sector was established. Under this new scenario, with the intention of taking into consideration biological restrictions of the resources, the first preventive measures were adopted in order to try to stabilize fishing fleet capacities through planning instruments, which go under the name of Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs).

MAGP-I covered the period 1983-86 and MAGP-II 1987-91. In the first case, each member state had to establish a national programme, which would stabilise its fleet's capacity. In the second case, the emphasis was placed on the need to adapt the fleet through a programme, which would reduce the capacity by 3% (measured in gross tonnage, GT) and engine power by 2% (measured in Kw). Neither of the two MAGPs managed to achieve the objectives set, mainly due to the compulsory nature of these measures that member states were required to adopt and the financial capacity

necessary to stimulate the modernisation of the fishing vessels (González-Laxe, 2010, p.184).

In the 1990s, the European Commission published a number of reports (European Commission, 1990, 1996) pointing out the need to adopt new measures to adapt the fishing capacity to the natural resources available. The CFP was reviewed (Council Regulations 3760/92 and 3699/93), leading to a certain degree of submission of the structural policy to the resource conservation and management policy. Additionally, in 1993 the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) was created, grouping together all of the public subsidies associated with structural actions. Within the ambits of contemplated subsidies, the most important were those related to the adjustment of fishing efforts (mainly scrapping and export of vessels to third world countries), fleet renovation and modernisation, and measures for the processing and marketing of fish products. Together, these three ambits absorbed approximately 75% of structural aid. In the period comprising 1992-2002, MAPGs III and IV were developed however, generally speaking, failed to reach the desired objectives; fleet capacity was only reduced between 5% and 12%, lower than European Commission expectations (which ranged between 17% and 40%, depending on the case, González-Laxe, 2010, p.184). The main factor, which would seem to have conditioned this result were the scant possibilities of the European Commission to penalise the member states that failed to comply with fleet reduction plans. On the other hand, we also emphasise the incorporation of technological innovations to the fleet, which brought about an effective increase in fishing capacity, despite the reduction in the number of vessels.

The European Commission soon admitted the relative failure of MAGP IV and proposed a series of initiatives in an attempt to redress the situation within the frame of the new European financial perspectives for the period 2000-2006 (known as Agenda 2000). The European Council, through Regulations 2792/1999 and 1263/99, adopted measures to halt fleet overcapacity, simplify administrative procedures, toughen sanctions and clearly define the aims of the FIFG's structural measures. The scope of application of structural assistance was organised into six lines of action, known as priority axes, and a total of 20 measures. The structural measures were also included in different multiannual programmes according to whether or not they affected regions with low levels of per capita income, known as Objective 1 Regions, with a GDP per capita lower than 75% of the overall EU average.

As this period commenced, in 2001 the Commission published the first Green Paper based on the future of the CFP (European Commission, 2001) focusing towards a Policy reform in 2003. The report's general conclusions insisted on the need for a greater adjustment of fleet capacity to real fishing possibilities. These possibilities would be set annually within the Resource Policy through the Total Allowable Catches (TACs) per species, which would be distributed among the different Member States. It was said that the high intensity of capital and significant excess of fishing capacity had not permitted the adequate remuneration of the capital used, while also endangering both the conservation of natural resources, as well as long-term economic and financial viability of companies in the sector. That is, the Commission itself was questioning the efficiency of the Fisheries Structural Policy and compliance with the aims set out in the CFP. Given this environment, it was no surprise that new initiatives were approved (EC Regulations 1451/2001 and 179/2002) which aimed to make fleet reduction programmes more efficient, simple and transparent, while at the same time toughening the requirements for obtaining public aid.

3. Results after the reform of the CFP in 2002.

The reform of the CFP (EC Regulation 2371/2002) introduced some innovative approaches to the Fisheries Structural Policy, with the main objective to adjust the capacity to potential catches. The aim was to also improve the compatibility of the CFP with other European policies (such as those related to the environment and employment), to integrate the idea of the precautionary principle for the protection and conservation of fishing resources, to seek ways in simplifying the fishing effort limitation systems and to increase the responsibility of each Member State in the management of their fishing fleets.

The following points have been highlighted in respect to the new policy applicable to fleets:

- The MAGPs were deemed finalised, and a long-term approach to fleet adjustment was adopted.
- A date was established for the end of 2004 to end all funding programmes for the construction of new vessels, including exports to third world countries and the establishment of joint ventures.

- The conditions for obtaining public funds for fleet renovation and modernisation were revised.
- Member states could only seek additional funds to adjust their fishing fleets, only if they were involved with fishing effort management regimes under recovery plans or in the event of a significant reduction of the TACs available.

The effects of this new stage have not yet been analysed in depth, as the final date for the eligibility of fundable expenditure through the FIG was extended until the 30th of June, 2009 (within the frame of the European Economic Recovery Plan to ease the effects of the crisis) and the term was extended until the 30th of September, 2010 so that member states could present the final document on settlement of expenses. However, from the data available (European Union, 2010), we can make an evaluation of the results achieved.

As can be seen in **Table 1**, for the period 2000-06, FIG funds, a value of almost 3,500 million euros was programmed. Initially, this included allocating 20% of the final budget finance measures from priority axis 1 (adjustment of fishing effort), 23.3% to measures from axis 2 (fleet renovation and modernisation), 34.4% to measures from axis 3 (protection of resources, aquaculture, ports, processing and marketing) and the remaining 22.2% was allocated to other measures and technical assistance. However, the reforms just mentioned above, introduced under EC Regulation 2371/2002, and a later addition of 10 new European States to the EU in 2004 (EU-25 countries) made it necessary to re-programme the funds. Therefore, in the frame of what was established in the new 2002 CFP, the amount of funds designated to joint businesses established with third world countries for the export of vessels and to the construction and modernisation of fleets, had to be reduced. On the other hand, it provided an increase in funds for the scrapping of vessels, for aquaculture projects, the improvement of fishing port installations, fish product processing and marketing projects and the financing of temporary cessation of fishing activities. For its part, the late inclusion of 10 new member states in the structural programme barely modified the distribution of budgetary resources, as 94.1% of the financial support programmed under the FIG continued to be allocated to initiatives in EU-15 countries.

By dividing the funds into areas of intervention, it enables us to observe the relative importance of each area and therefore, better understand European priorities as far as the structural policy is concerned. **Table 2** shows how, initially, almost 51% of the budgeted funds were designated to finance measures related to adjustments of fishing

fleets. With the reform of the CFP in 2002, the conditions to obtain financial aid for fishing fleet were toughened, in spite of which this area of intervention continued to receive 43.7% of the FIFG funds finally programmed, of which approximately a third was assigned to the scrapping of vessels.

The other most important area of intervention was noticed in industries comprising of fish product processing and marketing industries, which have experienced an increase of their relative importance in the funding programme reaching a 23.3% of the FIFG budget. On the other hand, it is interesting to note the increase in the number of projects involving the improvement of port facilities, designated to the fishing fleets (when in many areas this is an activity in decline), and the minor relative importance of funding designed to motivate the development of initiatives in the aquaculture sector (often identified as a strategic sector for the future).

As a result of the FIFG programme for the period 2000-2006, almost 85,000 EU-25 fisheries sector programmes were co-funded; most of them (around 94%) were developed in countries that belonged to the EU before the inclusion of 10 new member states in 2004 (EU-15). By order of country, (see **Table 3**), Spain profited the most, absorbing 47.9% of the total amount of funds, followed by Italy 9.4% and France 7.2%. Around 73.5% of FIFG funds in this period were designated to funding fishing projects in Objective 1 Regions. In average terms, FIFG co-funding stood at 37.6% of the total amount of programmes that were implemented, reaching 44.7% of investments made within Objective 1 Regions.

Over the period 1999-2008, it was estimated that the EU-15 fleet decreased by 20% of the total number of vessels, which reflected in the reduction of around 16% of the GT and 17% of the total Kw. (See **Table 4**). Amongst the EU-15 countries, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Italy suffered the most in the reduction of fleet during this period. Important fleet reductions also took place in countries making up the 10 Member States, which joined the EU in 2004, but over a lesser period of time (2004-2008), mainly Malta, Poland and Lithuania were affected. In spite of this significant fleet reduction over the last decade, judging by what was expressed in the second Green Paper on the Reform of the CFP (European Commission, 2009a), the Commission was less than satisfied with these results, affirming that "... excess fleet capacity is still the CFP's fundamental problem".

Summarily, structural funds in the last period signified an important destination for public financial resources. Most countries channelled their FIFG fundable initiatives towards projects involving fleet adjustment, in an effort to adapt fishing capacity to

the natural resources available. In spite of the significant fleet adjustments, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) estimates that of the 43 fish populations evaluated in European waters, 35 are over-fished and only 8 are being fished coherently under the criteria of the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) (European Communities, 2009). Financial assistance has not been successful in halting fishing overcapacity, and therefore remains one of the main problems of the CFP and its structural policy.

4. Current situation of the fisheries structural policy.

Another phase was initiated after 2007 with the creation of a new financial instrument specific to fisheries, the European Fisheries Fund (EFF). Its regulatory framework was established under Council Regulation (EC) No. 1198/2006, which sets out the basic principles, and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 498/2007, of 26 March 2007, laying down detailed rules for the implementation of the aforementioned Council Regulation and including the detailed procedures member states must follow.

In this phase, it was made compulsory for each member state to establish a National Strategic Plan for the fisheries sector for the period 2007-13, to include the objectives and priorities of such states in accordance with their situation and needs, as well as an Operational Programme, which sets out in detail the specific measures and the timescales in order to reach the objectives defined. The first few years (2007 and 2008) were almost entirely dedicated to preparing these documents, and for this reason the effective implementation of measures was scant. In accordance to the data provided by the Commission, the overall national Operational Plans, the objective of capacity reduction was set at around 15% (Kw and GT) for the end of 2013. As can be seen in **Figure 2**, the current CFP maintains the basic principles established in the Treaty of Rome specifically for agriculture in general, (including fishing) and for structural funds.

The general objectives of the CFP were established in the last reform in **2002**, and make special reference to promoting sustainability. On the part of the Fisheries Structural Policy, it is currently formulated via the EFF, defining 5 specific objectives and 5 priority action axes, where specific measures that can be co-financed are included.

The overall budget of the EFF amounts to 4,305 million euros, to be distributed over the 7-year period as defined (2007-2013) (European Communities, 2008). All member

states can benefit from these funds, however with the condition that 75% is to be allocated to projects from regions with low-income levels (now called Convergence Objective Regions) and under a system of co-financing on behalf of the beneficiary country (which varies according to the type of project and region). Within the possibilities the EFF offers, member states are those who choose the projects that could benefit from co-financing. To do so, they must set objectives and priorities in their Strategic Plans and specify the main measures that are to be co-financed over the period 2007-13 in the Operational Programmes. In agreement with the approved Operational Programmes, funds will be distributed throughout the EU in the following manner (data provided by the European Commission, 2009b, 2009c):

- For Priority 1 axis measures (fleet adjustment): 1,142.9 million Euros (almost 27% of the total).
- For Priority axis 2 measures (aquaculture, processing and marketing): 1,274.5 million Euros (almost 30% of the total).
- For Priority axis 3 measures (joint action): 1,162.0 million Euros (almost 27% of the total).
- For the remaining Priority axes measures, 4 and 5 (sustainable development and technical assistance): some 725.5 million Euros (16% of the total).

Generally, this new stage of the Fisheries Structural Policy has not led to drastic changes with respect to the previous one, continuing with the main characteristic trends in the Policy's historical evolution, which are summed up in **Figure 3**.

The CFP has been adapting by undergoing continuous reforms, incorporating the needs associated with the reality of fisheries of new member states, attempting to improve and learn from past experiences, without causing any radical changes in its concept. In fact, the basic principles established in the Treaty of Rome have been maintained and its general objectives continue to be very similar to those laid out in the first CFP of 1983.

Additionally, it is a policy that with the incorporation of new elements it has gradually increased in complexity and, therefore, needs to be simplified. In fact, in the 2000-2006 period, with the 2002 CFP reform currently in force and under the FIFG, 60 programmes in 24 Member States were implemented, with initiatives linked to 20 different measures under 6 priority axes. In spite of this, 90% of the initiatives programmed were implemented (European Union, 2010) in FIFG's programme schedule 2000-2006. A new phase in structural policy was initiated with the creation of the EFF in 2007, which took into account, the need to simplify the application

procedures and select the subsidising initiatives; and that each member state have a single Strategic Plan and its corresponding Operational Programme.

As the Fisheries Structural Policy reforms were being implemented, attempts were also made at improving the internal coherence of the measures (their mutual compatibility), their consistency based on the needs and objectives established and, in turn, coherence with the CFP's (Resources, Markets and External Fisheries Resources) and Maritime and Structural Policies in Europe (Cohesion Funds, European Social Fund). In this context, in the consecutive modifications of the subsidisable measures made, major emphasis was placed on the compatibility of funds designated to fishing fleets and the need to adjust to the natural resources available. In fact, finance for the construction of new fishing vessels or improving the efficiency of already-existing ones was gradually withdrawn, and in the current EFF's, financial assistance to help modernise or improve conditions on board would under no circumstance imply increased catch capacity or engine power.

Finally, successive reforms have led to a greater decentralisation of the Fisheries Structural Policy. Under the current EFF, it has placed the focus on simplification, transparency and strategic planning, placing even greater responsibility on member states in selecting the measures they wish to adopt and prioritise (within those permitted), as well as the allocation of funds (through the national strategic plans and operational programmes). Member states have the duty to inform the public, potential beneficiaries and interested parties about the possibilities the EFF offers. This process of decentralisation has reached the regional level, where regional and local governments have the authority to constitute local development groups that can apply for European funding under the EFF's Priority axis 4.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations.

In conformity with our observations, we estimate that the forthcoming reform of the CFP in 2012 will not imply, generally speaking, significant changes. A powerful element of inertia exists in the structures and practices of a policy that has been functioning for almost three decades, making it foreseeable that the reformed CFP will not involve any drastic changes in either the basic principles, in the general and specific objectives or in the current EFF's Priority Action Axes. That is, any eventual changes will take place almost exclusively within the scope of the operational

objectives and the specific measures of application of the Structural Policy via the EFF (see **Figure 4**).

Bearing this general evaluation in mind, we identify some aspects related to certain measures, subject to advancements and changes to the reform:

- Simplification of procedures: the scheme based on the Strategic Plans and Operational Programmes can be looked at in greater depth, adopt measures that make the selection methods for subsidisable projects easier, improve the measures to obtain veracious information (which makes it easier to monitor the initiatives implemented in all the member states) and other measures to simplify the procedures and reduce the deadlines of payment to selected project beneficiaries. In order to illustrate the administrative complexity of the current Fisheries Structural Policy, we can provide two representative examples included in a recent EU report (European Union, 2010). In the majority of member states, there is an average of 147-day course period between the moment the application of financial assistance is placed and the time the beneficiary receives the payment. It is estimated that the administrative costs of processing the Fisheries Structural Fund amount, on an average, rise to 15.3 € for every 100 € of funds processed, around 4 times more than for other CFP actions.
- Prioritisation of measures: in order to increase the efficiency and coherence of the measures, it is possible to move towards a format where there is a need to clearly define the priority measures from those that are not. In accordance with these explicit priorities, the allocation of funds among the different areas of intervention must be established (fleet, aquaculture, processing and marketing, etc.). In spite of the fact that, since the European Commission emphasises the need to reduce the fleet, when implementing the Operational Programmes each member state establishes its own strategy. Thus, for example, when the first measures associated with the EFF were being implemented, Ireland allocated 82% of the funds received to its fishing fleet, while Romania only allocated 4.3% to the same sector (European Commission, 2009c).
- Coherence with conservation and management of marine resource policy: external coherence in finding the balance between fishing capacity and available natural resources could be emphasised. It is obvious that a real consistency on this point has not been reached yet, despite the fact that it has systematically been the main focal point of the continuous reforms. In this context, it is probable that the conditions regarding eligibility for financial assistance for fleet adjustments will continue to

toughen or along the lines of what we pointed out above, establish a diminishing percentage of funds designated towards fleet investment. The fact that these limits do not exist in the member states' current Operational Programmes makes it impossible to vary the level of public funds in function with the existing and real necessities. For example, public funds for the scrapping of a vessel are similar, regardless of whether or not it belongs to an oversized fleet segment in relation to the fish quotas available.

- Coherence with the Market Policy on fisheries: some external incoherencies related to the channelling of structural funds for the creation and promotion of new Producers' Organisations. It would seem logical to think that the financial resources allocated to these purposes should be correctly located, that is, they ought to form a part of the financial instruments of the Common Market Organisation for fisheries (falling within the Market Policy on Fisheries), and not continue within the EFF.
- Emphasis on Convergence Regions: In spite of the fact that EFF has officially lost its role as a structural fund, its logic and objectives remain typical of this kind of fund. For this reason, action can continue to increase in regions with a lower level of income per capita. The minimum percentage of funds that must be allocated to projects in these regions (at present, standing at 75%) could be raised, the percentage of public co-funding of these projects increased or, also emphasise the development of integral economic diversification plans in coastal regions that depend on fishing.
- Coordination of investment: Another area of improvement lies in the analysis and verification of approved projects compatible with the strategies followed at regional level and with existing needs. This would involve greater coordination of investment, in order to avoid overinvestment in facilities, (in ports where fishing activities are on the decline, for example), or in business initiatives which do not meet business demands (overproduction of some aquaculture subsector species with clear repercussions on market prices).
- Territoriality: With a view to tending towards decentralisation, the new structural policy shows possibilities for improvement, if it moves towards promoting joint initiatives from a territorial perspective, not necessarily national, setting clear time objectives and goals. This possibility has already been contemplated in axis 4 of the EFF (relating to sustainable development), however we can go into greater depth if we allow the participation of other possible agents involved (researchers, experts, agents from other economic sectors, etc.) as well as the main agents (administrations and sector).

In conclusion, the Fisheries Structural Policy in Europe has undergone numerous regulatory and contextual changes, but its essence has not been substantially modified since the first CFP. Frequently, especially from the European Commission, the focal point has been placed on the need to balance fishing capacity with the natural resources available. However, the responsibility for the maladjustment does not solely lie within the Fisheries Structural Policy, nor has this policy limited itself to cater to this specific aspect of the CFP. Generally, a traditional approach to all European Structural Policies has been followed, helping social cohesion and reducing the differences between the different regions of the EU. It must be taken into consideration that the areas with significant fisheries activity usually belong to Regions with lower income levels, and through the Fisheries Structural Policy, these regions have benefited thanks to the development of fleet modernisation initiatives, aquaculture, processing plants, diversification of activities... which would probably not have occurred without EU funding.

Acknowledgements

Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación de España (ECO2009-10324) and Xunta de Galicia (09SEC012300PR) is gratefully acknowledged. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable suggestions.

FIGURES




Figure 1. The Evolution of the Fisheries Structural Policy




Figure 2. The current Fisheries Structural Policy's Principles, Objectives and Measures

Trends	Significant characteristics
Adaptation Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On-going changes linked to different MAGPs, CFP reforms or financial instruments (FIG, EFF) • Preserving basic principles and general objectives of the first CFP
Growing complexity and need for simplification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With FIG 2000-06: 60 programmes from 24 Member States, with 20 types of measures • With EFF 2007-13: Each Member State has a single Strategic Plan with its Operational Programme
Intention to increase internal and external consistency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal consistency: rendering different EFF measures compatible with the needs and goals • External consistency with the rest of CFP and maritime structural policies • Emphasis on balance between fleet-resources
Progressing towards greater decentralisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greater responsibility of Member States in choosing the measures to be implemented with the funds and their subsequent implementation • Member States must convey information to users • Possibility of local action groups

Figure 3. Trends in the Evolution of the EU Fisheries Structural Policy




Figure 4. Synthesis of Conclusions and Recommendations

TABLES

Table 1
FIFG 2000: Programming per priority axes and measures

Priority Axes	Main Measures	1st programme (1000 €)	Last programme (1000 €)	EU-15 (1000 €)
1. Adjustment of fishing effort	11. Scrapping	463,255	493,911	425,068
	12. Transfers to third countries	26,981	32,429	27,451
	13. Joint ventures	209,858	33,199	33,199
2. Fleet renewal and modernisation	21. Building new vessels	544,865	472,185	472,185
	22. Modernising existing vessels	269,185	174,870	168,461
3. Protection of resources, aquaculture, ports, processing and marketing	31. Protection of resources	61,239	53,410	52,154
	32. Aquaculture	277,667	324,008	310,389
	33. Fishing ports	206,291	354,985	328,285
	34. Processing and marketing	619,658	702,462	650,606
	35. Inland fishing	37,944	2,520	2,413
4. Other measures	41. Coastal and artisanal fishing	47,239	17,471	16,755
	42. Social and economic measures	102,209	42,871	34,442
	43. Promotion	137,446	107,096	102,673
	44. Producers' Organizations	152,658	173,173	172,615
	45. Temporary cessation of activities	160,518	270,703	264,836
	46. Innovative measures	106,262	156,187	147,202
5. Technical assistance	51. Technical assistance	70,365	70,075	66,500
	TOTAL	3,493,640	3,481,555	3,275,234

Source: European Union (2010). Data based upon National Programs

Table 2
FIFG 2000-2006: Programming per action area

Action Areas	Measures contemplated	1st programme (1000 €)	% total	Last programme (1000 €)	% total
Fishing fleet	11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 42, 45	1,776,871	50,9%	1,520,168	43,7%
Aquaculture	32	277,667	7,9%	324,008	9,3%
Port facilities	33	206,291	5,9%	354,985	10,2%
Processing and marketing	34, 43	757,104	21,7%	809,558	23,3%
Sector organisation	44	152,658	4,4%	173,173	5,0%
Innovation	46	106,262	3,0%	156,187	4,5%
Other measures	31, 35, 41, 51	216,787	6,2%	143,476	4,1%
	TOTAL	3,493,640	100,0%	3,481,555	100,0%

Source: European Union (2010).

Table 3

FIFG 2000-2006: Projects per country. Total amount executed

	Total amounts			Amounts in Objective 1 Regions		
	Projects (no.)	Amount executed (1000 €)	FIFG Grant (1000 €)	Projects (no.)	Amount executed (1000 €)	FIFG Grant (1000 €)
Spain	33,751	4,169,306	1,708,445	25,872	3,345,098	1,509,572
Italy	8,607	984,443	336,867	4,607	755,406	243,629
France	10,490	1,010,481	256,703	957	73,264	32,658
Greece	5,574	381,717	206,507	5,574	381,717	206,507
Portugal	5,844	407,108	202,331	5,844	407,108	202,331
U.K.	1,934	500,598	165,972	881	195,471	91,117
Poland	4,067	257,539	146,982	4,067	257,539	146,982
Germany	2,482	432,518	132,254	456	194,572	86,550
Denmark	3,400	489,893	119,350	0	0	0
Ireland	1,051	166,065	72,849	94	46,648	17,768
Sweden	1,904	176,834	52,491	325	14,774	7,201
Finland	2,738	163,013	41,823	776	34,711	8,816
Netherlands	666	102,906	34,946	164	23,292	5,648
Latvia	504	41,274	25,239	504	41,274	25,239
Belgium	234	75,860	18,690	3	13,832	1,556
Lithuania	129	19,272	12,099	129	19,272	12,099
Estonia	275	30,025	11,387	275	30,025	11,387
Austria	670	33,790	4,537	15	706	200
Czech Rep.	201	10,684	3,763	201	10,684	3,763
Hungary	51	8,777	3,288	51	8,777	3,288
Cyprus	142	11,886	3,249	0	0	0
Malta	27	3,183	2,460	27	3,183	2,460
Slovakia	20	4,928	1,725	20	4,928	1,725
Slovenia	45	5,089	1,708	45	5,089	1,708
UE-25	84,806	9,487,189	3,565,665	50,887	5,867,370	2,622,204
UE-15	79,345	9,094,532	3,353,765	45,568	5,486,599	2,413,553

Source: European Union (2010) based on Infosys data covering operations until end of 2008.

Table 4
Evolution of the European Union Fishing Fleet, 1999-2008.

	No. of Vessels			Capacity (1000 GT)			Power (1000 Kw)			% variation from 1999 to 2008		
	1999	2004	2008	1999	2004	2008	1999	2004	2008	Vessels	GT	Kw
Belgium	128	121	100	22.8	22.8	19.0	63.5	65.6	60.6	-21.9	-16.8	-4.5
Denmark	4,220	3,406	2,895	104.3	96.0	73.0	387.7	335.7	263.9	-31.4	-30.0	-31.9
Germany	2,313	2,163	1,828	69.4	66.3	69.1	163.7	162.0	161.2	-21.0	-0.3	-1.5
Ireland	1,689	1,436	2,023	64.8	86.9	69.9	208.2	213.7	193.4	19.8	7.8	-7.1
Greece	20,069	18,545	17,353	107.9	95.6	88.8	632.3	550.7	511.0	-13.5	-17.7	-19.2
Spain	17,321	14,057	11,420	533.3	491.2	461.1	1,381.7	1,152.0	1,029.5	-34.1	-13.5	-25.5
France	8,303	7,884	7,941	215.2	215.1	199.3	1,110.0	1,066.3	1,082.3	-4.4	-7.4	-2.5
Italy	18,260	14,909	13,683	246.8	215.6	196.3	1,463.4	1,243.5	1,149.1	-25.1	-20.4	-21.5
Netherlands	1,118	862	825	191.8	195.3	146.9	503.6	463.3	344.1	-26.2	-23.4	-31.7
Portugal	10,839	10,068	8,585	118.6	112.5	106.5	393.8	390.7	383.1	-20.8	-10.2	-2.7
Finland	3,765	3,394	3,240	21.5	18.3	16.0	203.9	179.5	169.7	-13.9	-25.4	-16.8
Sweden	2,066	1,600	1,486	50.2	44.6	41.8	234.9	217.9	208.9	-28.1	-16.6	-11.1
U. Kingdom	7,860	7,035	6,555	267.5	223.0	206.0	974.0	899.7	832.8	-16.6	-23.0	-14.5
EU-15	97,951	85,480	77,934	2,014.1	1,883.1	1,693.8	7,720.8	6,940.5	6,389.6	-20.4	-15.9	-17.2
										% variation from 2004 to 2008		
Estonia		1,051	966		24.9	17.8		63.2	46.0	-8.1	-28.4	-27.3
Cyprus		897	1,169		11.9	5.4		52.7	49.0	30.3	-54.8	-6.9
Latvia		942	841		42.1	38.2		72.5	61.1	-10.7	-9.2	-15.8
Lithuania		302	221		75.4	50.5		77.8	59.8	-26.8	-33.0	-23.2
Malta		2,133	1,152		20.0	11.0		122.2	86.2	-46.0	-45.2	-29.5
Poland		1,248	833		45.6	41.0		146.9	99.0	-33.3	-10.1	-32.7
Slovenia		169	181		1.1	1.0		11.0	10.7	7.1	-7.3	-2.8
EU-25		92,222	83,297		2,104.0	1,858.6		7,486.9	6,801.3	-9.7	-11.7	-9.2
Bulgaria			2,852			9.0			70.5			
Romania			438			1.7			6.2			
EU-27			86,587			1,869.3			6,878.0			

Source: Eurostat (2010), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=fish_fleet&lang=en.

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