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dc.contributor.authorMosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo 
dc.contributor.authorGarcía Jurado, Ignacio
dc.contributor.authorFiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria 
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-06T13:17:06Z
dc.date.available2019-02-06T13:17:06Z
dc.date.issued2008-02
dc.identifier.citationAnnals of Operations Research, 158(1): 183-188 (2008)spa
dc.identifier.issn02545330
dc.identifier.issn15729338
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11093/1176
dc.description.abstractIn this note we deal with inventory games as defined in Meca et al. (Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:483-491, 2003). In that context we introduce the property of immunity to coalitional manipulation, and demonstrate that the SOC-rule (share the ordering cost) is the unique allocation rule for inventory games which satisfies this property.spa
dc.description.sponsorshipMinisterio de Educación y Ciencia, FEDER | Ref. SEJ2005-07637-C02-02spa
dc.description.sponsorshipXunta de Galicia | Ref. PGIDIT06PXIC207038PNspa
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherAnnals of Operations Researchspa
dc.titleA note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory managementspa
dc.typearticlespa
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessspa
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10479-007-0240-y
dc.identifier.editorhttp://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-007-0240-yspa
dc.publisher.departamentoEstatística e investigación operativaspa
dc.publisher.grupoinvestigacionInferencia Estatística, Decisión e Investigación Operativaspa
dc.subject.unesco1207.08 Inventariosspa
dc.date.updated2019-02-06T11:43:44Z
dc.computerCitationpub_title=Annals of Operations Research|volume=158|journal_number=1|start_pag=183|end_pag=188spa
dc.referencesThis is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Annals of Operations Research. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-007-0240-y”.spa


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