Equilibria in a competitive model arising from linear production situations with a common-pool resource
UNIVERSAL IDENTIFIER: http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1182
EDITED VERSION: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11750-017-0438-3
UNESCO SUBJECT: 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
DOCUMENT TYPE: article
In this paper we deal with linear production situations in which there is a limited common-pool resource, managed by an external agent. The profit that a producer can attain depends on the amount of common-pool resource obtained through a certain procedure. We contemplate a competitive process among the producers and study the corresponding non-cooperative games, describing their (strict) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. It is shown that strict Nash equilibria form a subset of strong Nash equilibria, which in turn form a proper subset of Nash equilibria.
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