Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games
UNIVERSAL IDENTIFIER: http://hdl.handle.net/11093/2451
EDITED VERSION: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-019-00527-z
UNESCO SUBJECT: 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
DOCUMENT TYPE: article
In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalition-merge convex and ordinally convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.
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