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dc.contributor.authorAlcalde Unzu, Jorge
dc.contributor.authorGómez Rúa, María 
dc.contributor.authorMolis, Elena
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-02T13:12:10Z
dc.date.available2022-03-01T00:15:07Z
dc.date.issued2021-03
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Game Theory, 50, 185-214 (2020)spa
dc.identifier.issn00207276
dc.identifier.issn14321270
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11093/2815
dc.description.abstractWe consider the problem of cleaning a transboundary river, proposed by Ni and Wang (Games Econ Behav 60:176–186, 2007). A river is modeled as a segment divided into subsegments, each occupied by one region, from upstream to downstream. The waste is transferred from one region to the next at some rate. Since this transfer rate may be unknown, the social planner could have uncertainty over each region’s responsibility. Two natural candidates to distribute the costs in this setting would be the method that assigns to each region its expected responsibility and the one that assigns to each region its median responsibility. We show that the latter is equivalent to the Upstream Responsibility method (Alcalde-Unzu et al. in Games Econ Behav 90:134–150, 2015) and the former is a new method that we call Expected Responsibility. We compare both solutions and analyze them in terms of a new property of monotonicity.en
dc.description.sponsorshipMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2015-64330-Pspa
dc.description.sponsorshipXunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014spa
dc.description.sponsorshipMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-Rspa
dc.description.sponsorshipMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2017- 82241-Rspa
dc.description.sponsorshipGobierno Vasco | Ref. IT-568-13spa
dc.description.sponsorshipMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2015-67519-Pspa
dc.description.sponsorshipJunta de Andalucía | Ref. SEJ1436spa
dc.description.sponsorshipJunta de Andalucía | Ref. SEJ492spa
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherInternational Journal of Game Theoryspa
dc.relationinfo-eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PGC2018-093542-B-I00/ES/DISEÑO Y APLICACION DE MODELOS ECONOMICOS PARA EL ANALISIS INSTITUCIONAL
dc.relationinfo-eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/ECO2014-52616-R/ES/DISEÑO DE REGLAS DE REPARTO Y MEDICION DE LAS DESIGUALDADES LABORALES
dc.relationinfo-eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/ECO2017-82241-R/ES/REGLAS DE DECISION COLECTIVA Y ANALISIS DE DISPARIDADES LABORALES
dc.relationinfo-eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/ECO2015-67519-P/ES/INTERACCION SOCIAL Y ECONOMICA
dc.relationinfo-eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2019-110783GB-I00/ES/PREFERENCIAS Y POLITICAS SOBRE EL SISTEMA DEL BIENESTAR BAJO ELECCION
dc.titleAllocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibilityen
dc.typearticlespa
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccessspa
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00182-020-00746-w
dc.identifier.editorhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00746-wspa
dc.publisher.departamentoEstatística e investigación operativaspa
dc.publisher.grupoinvestigacionECOSOT: Economía, Sociedade e Territoriospa
dc.subject.unesco5399 Otras Especialidades económicasspa
dc.date.updated2021-12-02T13:08:38Z
dc.computerCitationpub_title=International Journal of Game Theory|volume=50|journal_number=|start_pag=185|end_pag=214spa


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