On benefits of cooperation under strategic power
DATE:
2019-12-11
UNIVERSAL IDENTIFIER: http://hdl.handle.net/11093/4744
EDITED VERSION: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6
UNESCO SUBJECT: 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
DOCUMENT TYPE: article
ABSTRACT
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies.
Files in this item
![pdf [PDF]](/xmlui/themes/Mirage2/images/thumbnails/mimes/pdf.png)
- Name:
- 2019_fiestras_benefits_coopera ...
- Size:
- 378.3Kb
- Format:
- Description:
- accepted manuscript