Applying the Shapley value to the tuna fishery
UNIVERSAL IDENTIFIER: http://hdl.handle.net/11093/4914
EDITED VERSION: https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0377221722010086
UNESCO SUBJECT: 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos ; 1209.04 Teoría y Proceso de decisión ; 5312.01 Agricultura, Silvicultura, Pesca
DOCUMENT TYPE: article
The tuna fishing sector has faced important regulatory restrictions for years, mainly based on the number of fish aggregating devices (FADs) allowed per vessel, which has threatened the survival of many tuna firms. Various academics have studied this issue, proposing various solutions based on the reassignment and sharing of FADs. However, previous research has focused primarily on the use of FADs and their implications, rather than actually helping to optimize the tuna fleet’s fishing activity, and possibly for this reason, none of these proposals has impacted current fishing practices. In light of this situation, our research proposes a more equitable approach: we have modeled the tuna vessel problem as a cooperative game, reallocating FADs among vessels, studying the Shapley value, and comparing the results achieved with previous proposals. Although our approach is fairly standard in the literature, it is a novel solution to a deep-rooted problem in this sector that also leads to a significant reduction in emissions associated with fuel consumption. In fact, the application of our theoretical results to real data shows that there is not only a significant scope for improvement for firms and their vessels –both gain more revenue– but also a beneficial contribution to the environment in terms of reduced fuel consumption.
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