RT Journal Article
T1 A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management
A1 Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
A1 García Jurado, Ignacio
A1 Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
K1 1207.08 Inventarios
AB In this note we deal with inventory games as defined in Meca et al. (Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:483-491, 2003). In that context we introduce the property of immunity to coalitional manipulation, and demonstrate that the SOC-rule (share the ordering cost) is the unique allocation rule for inventory games which satisfies this property.
PB Annals of Operations Research
SN 02545330
YR 2008
FD 2008-02
LK http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1176
UL http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1176
LA eng
NO Annals of Operations Research, 158(1): 183-188 (2008)
NO Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, FEDER | Ref. SEJ2005-07637-C02-02
DS Investigo
RD 01-dic-2023