RT Journal Article
T1 Sustainable allocation of greenhouse gas emission permits for firms with Leontief technologies
A1 Gutiérrez Núñez, Elisabeth
A1 Llorca Pascual, Natividad
A1 Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín
A1 Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
K1 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
AB In this paper we deal with production situations where a cap or limit to the amount of greenhouse gas emissions permitted is imposed. Fixing a tax for each ton of pollutant emitted is also considered. We use bankruptcy rules to define cooperative games with externalities associated with these situations and analyze the existence of coalitionally stable allocations of the emission permits. We prove that the constrained equal awards (CEA) rule provides stable allocations and as a direct mechanism, it is incentive compatible. These two facts have interesting managerial implications to control pollution emissions.
PB European Journal of Operational Research
SN 03772217
YR 2018
FD 2018-08-16
LK http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1183
UL http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1183
LA eng
NO European Journal of Operational Research, 269(1): 5-15 (2018)
NO Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, FEDER | Ref. MTM2011-23205
DS Investigo
RD 10-oct-2024